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The Cambridge High Tech Cluster: resilience and response to cyclical trends
Introduction
Innovative economic activity is stimulated by scientific and engineering research only under certain conditions. R&D must give rise to new goods and services either from established or entrepreneurial ventures meeting specialist demand in the international economy (OECD 2000; Mowery and Rosenberg 1998; Best 2000) . Cambridge tech-based firms have been hailed as demonstrating that new applications of knowledge can generate important innovations in local clusters of innovative firms (Minshall 2008; Library House 2006) . In economic history, emerging and early diffusing tech firms (high tech clusters) followed broad cyclical patterns, but with amplified growth during economic upturns and sharp sectorspecific downturns. With this in mind we explore trends in firm and job numbers in technology based firms in the Cambridge area in relation to the recession of the early 1990s, the expansion of the late 1990s and the economic volatility of the current decade. We find that Cambridge tech firms were relatively resilient to cyclical pressures during the 1980s and 1990s but that there was sector-specific volatility in the current decade, pre-figuring economic difficulties that have since become evident elsewhere in the economy.
Why are firms that base their activities on emerging and newly diffusing technologies (high tech firms) prone to economic cycles? Sector-specific booms and business cycles have been associated with emerging technologies since the industrial revolution. As pioneering technologies come to win customers and eventually bring in returns to early investors, they attract further investment. With diffusion of the technology, above average profits are eroded with the onset of competition. Inflated expectations subside, often marked by a collapse of investment support. Booms and slumps are not merely a response to macro conditions (Atella, et al.2008) . They have also been set off by the emergence of major technologies since the early days of canal and railroad transport (Nairn 2002; Baines et al 2003) .
Confidence was eventually restored when further sales and returns reassured investors and the technology continued to be diffused (Nairn 2000; Gartner 2006) . Since new technologies tend to swarm (Schumpeter 1928) , this syndrome may work its way through a swathe of related technologies, as occurred during the Internet boom and crash around the year 2000.
Cyclical influences have until recently been neglected in cluster studies. Cycles at the macro level do not map directly onto local trends in firm and job numbers (Audretsch and and Acs 1994) . Economic cycles are tracked by such indicators as rates of GNP growth and changes in share prices, but the relationship between these factors and local trends is complex, because of the multiplicity of other influences to which young technology firms are subject. They are affected by factors which include local infrastructure, local industry shifts, investment patterns and skill availability. Attempts to isolate and model the impact of such variables with limited data availability could result in spurious precision (Collard and Dellas 2007) . Our aim is simply to examine recent trends in a well known high tech cluster, using a longitudinal business dataset, in order to identify discontinuities in the expansion and contraction of technology-based firms and jobs, against the background of cyclical influences
Overview of trends in technology based activity in the Cambridge Area
The expansion of high tech activity in Cambridge coincided with the information revolution. Earlier studies have shown that Cambridge was a pioneering centre of advanced computing power which was made available to private firms through time-sharing arrangements provided by the university's government-funded Atlas Computer (Garnsey and Cannon-Brookes 1992, Garnsey and Heffernan 2005) .
A number of IT enterprises were founded in the late 1970s and the 1980s, contributing to the rapid rise in numbers of tech based firms in the area over the latter decade. The location of the government CAD centre gave rise to enterprise in Computer Aided Design, resulting in the spin-out of a number of companies, including Cambridge Interactive Systems. These pioneering companies were acquired as CAD matured and the international CAD industry consolidated. Some of the acquired firms were relocated and closed. However knowledge developed by entrepreneurs and engineers active in CAD was applied to Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and other information technologies, with the founding of such firms as Smallworld and the recruitment of CAD engineers into many other local IT companies.
Long-lived spin-outs from the university engineering department, Cambridge Instruments and Pye, the radio and instruments company, were founded in the nineteenth century and the 1930s, respectively.
Both experienced problems in making the transition from the electro-mechanical technologies to applying information technology throughout their systems and were subject to merger and acquisitions as their industries consolidated, with the loss of several thousand jobs in Cambridge in the early 1990s.
Government assistance was available through Manufacturing Modernisation programmes in US (Best 1999 ) and subsidies to German engineering firms to encourage the transition to IT based systems. US and German companies became leading customers of the Cambridge CAD companies' pioneering CAD products like MEDUSA. In the UK, the Thatcher government was retreating from government assistance to industry. The local instruments sector did not fully recover from the closures and drastic downsizing of the larger instruments firms in Cambridge. However the downsized companies became a source of experienced managers for local firms founded in the area to exploit new information technologies.
The rise and fall in numbers in the recession of the early 1990s is reflected in our longitudinal dataset on technology based firms in Cambridgeshire (Figure 1 ). During the recession of 1990-1992, Cambridge high tech activity was more resilient than activities in many other places. Nationally, there was a reduction in GDP of 2.5% and company earnings declined by 25%. Unemployment rose from 6.9% in 1990 to 10.7% in 1993 (Office of National Statistics). The marked fall in jobs seen in figure 1 between 1990 and 1992 mainly took place in the few older, larger firms in the area. This was followed by a stabilisation in the number of firms. Entries of new firms soon resulted in expansion in numbers of tech based firms in the area, and employment had recovered by 1994, as small new firms provided jobs that made up the numbers depleted in earlier job losses in the larger instruments firms (Garnsey and Cannon Brookes 1992) .
Analysis of entry and exit rates of firms in the area show a high rate of churn, with a hundred firms starting or closing in some years. This instability underlies the aggregate trends in figure The contrast between VAT registrations among all start-ups in Cambridgeshire and the fall in tech startups in Cambridgeshire after 2004 suggests that tech start-ups may have been disproportionately affected by financial stringency during the housing boom.
Firms by Size Category
Disaggregating firms by more detailed categories reveals some of the factors underlying the totals. It is often remarked that there are few large tech based businesses there are in the Cambridge area (e.g.
Owen 2004), The size distribution of Cambridge tech firms is actually less skewed in the direction of small firms than is the case nationally, where the preponderance of small firms is even greater (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005) . The shortage of established 'anchor' firms in the area is a matter of concern where these firms provide custom for other local firms and are better able to survive temporary downturns in their markets. However those establishments in the database most likely to cease trading in the area were implanted branch establishments which had the largest associated job loss on exit (figure 4), We explore this issue further below, in analysing changes in firm size. Larger firms founded in the area were more likely to remain in the area than were implants, even when the former experienced changes of ownership.
Local branches set up in the area of firms headquartered elsewhere proved to be less well anchored than firms originating in the area. The fall in average size after 2004 and the rise in 2006 indicates that micro-firm start-ups was followed by closures -a pattern is confirmed by Figure 7 which shows micro-firms by their foundation year.
Figure 7 High tech microfirms in Cambridgeshire in 2006
In contrast with micro-firm trends, the larger firms are less likely to be new. Many long-standing firms of a larger than average size, of which there were 123 in total, had been based in Cambridgeshire since 1988 or before (Figure 8 ). As regards start-ups, despite the downturn, it is striking that 74 companies (8% of total founded since 2000) started since 2000 were founded at a sufficiently large size, or had grown enough, to attain the size of the largest 20% of firms.
To find out whether larger firms originated as indigenous start-ups or were moved into the area, we used archive sources and telephone interviews to examine the history of the 63 firms that achieved a size of over 100 employees. Number of Firms .
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We found that most of the larger established firms had early indigenous roots in Cambridge (Figure 9 .) rather than being attracted from elsewhere. This points to the value of competencies accumulated locally, persisting through changes of ownership in some cases. We have already seen that branches of implant firms are more likely to close than are indigenous larger firms. No. of firms .
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Firms are assigned to sectors on the basis of their SIC code. This coding system is unsatisfactory in many 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 No. of Firms .
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The boom period of rapid expansion was followed by many fewer IT software start-ups in the period There were intermittent discontinuities in employment growth as firms encountered and overcame difficulties, but there was no contraction in the steady accumulation of technical competence, as revealed by numbers of patents registered by five of these firms. 85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08 Number of Patents .
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In the case of technical design consultancies, the four largest have grown from a total of 695 employees in 1988 to 1125 employees in 1998 and to 1375 employees in 2008. 
Ten year trends.
We now turn to the question of decade-long trends in size and sectoral activity of technology firms in the Cambridge area. The database evidence examined here does not reflect directly on the issue of whether congestion has made Cambridge a less attractive place to do business, but this issue requires, as a start, analysis over a longer period than the recent boom and contraction. Our aim here is to examine recent data in longer term perspective; trend lines are drawn for the period of data availability 1988-2006.
( Figure 15, Figure 16 ). 7 The hump of expansion during the boom years 1996-2004 was followed by decline in firm numbers. Whether this reflects a return to the earlier pre-boom trend or further decline will depend on the severity of the recession and whether firms founded in the adverse conditions of recession prove as robust as were the cohorts of the early 1990s.
7 Some recent changes are missed in the survey and added to the database subsequently. 
Merger and Acquisition trends
Cambridge technology firms are attractive targets for acquisition by corporations seeking to improve their innovation performance by buying a promising technology and/ or innovative team. Figure 17 presents the trend in acquisitions in four sectors: telecoms, IT software, instruments and biotechnology.
Together these sectors account for the majority of takeovers identifiable in the database since 1988, though further takeovers not flagged in the database have been found from other sources for these sectors. 8 On this evidence, the level of acquisitions increased markedly during the period of the technology boom after 1996. Acquisition rates rose to a peak at the height of the boom in 1999/2000 in telecoms, IT software, and biotechnology but remained stable in the more mature instrumentation sector.
The increase in acquisition numbers is likely to reflect the rapid expansion of venture capital investments in the area, since venture capitalists, being intermediaries, are under pressure to exit early to achieve 8 We are indebted to Vivian Mohr who combed the database firms in the main sectors for takeovers, checking the data against web sources, company histories, backed by direct inquiries, making it possible to present the first cluster-wide data available on acquisitions in the Cambridge area. To assess the local impact of acquisition, flows of capital into the area and the impact on jobs and firm numbers would, ideally, be examined, but the recipients of capital flows (whether locals or externals) are unknown. Relatively few companies provide performance figures for an acquired unit, but it proved possible to find such data for 47 acquired units. Table 1 summarises the proportion of units in which expansion occurred pre-and post-acquisition for the firms providing evidence. The majority of acquired units were expanding before takeover, firms acquired being those in the area with best performance and prospects. The proportion of target units continuing to grow after takeover was lower than before takeover in biotech and IT firms. Net contraction occurred after acquisition in instruments and telecomm firms. There were job losses in all four sectors following acquisition of these firms, most noticeably in the telecommunication sector (Table 1) . For those firms issuing performance figures for acquired units, there were 1365 fewer jobs after acquisition than there had been when these firms (in biotech, instruments, IT software and telecoms sectors) were independent. We do not know what would have occurred had the firms remained independent, nor whether changes resulted from productivity improvements, strategic reorientation or loss of custom. In the case of biotechnology firms engaged in labour intensive research and development, productivity improvements are an unlikely explanation of contraction. Case study evidence indicates that strategic reorientation by the acquirer is the most usual driver of change in the acquired unit.
Acquisitions often result in spin-outs of new companies, but downsizing on this scale was not matched by jobs created in newly formed firms spun out by employees, given the small size of most start-ups.
Acquired units become branch firms, subject to subsequent closure and relocation as identified earlier, while spin-outs may subsequently expand.
Economic Volatility and Activity in Emerging Sectors
The fall in national output after 2003 was followed by expansion fuelled by the property boom, ended by the financial crisis. This has been a period of economic volatility in the nation at large (Figure 18 ). The pattern of expansion and contraction among Cambridge firms did not mirror these trends because there were other factors at work such as availability of venture capital. Cambridge has benefited from the continued flow of funds and talent through the university, which is more immune to recession than most organisations (Shahid and Kaora, 2007) . There are over 300 firms directly originating from the university in the area (Garnsey and Heffernan 2002) . These are particularly vulnerable in their first years and so would be very sensitive to financial conditions.
We saw that the expansion of the technology cluster depends on entries exceeding exits and on the survival and growth of cluster firms. We have seen that the distribution of firms is not less favourable in terms of size than that found nationally, and that since 2000 over 70 firms grew to reach the largest size category. It is also of interest to compare survival rates of firms started in the Cambridge area in succeeding periods (Figure 20) . The survival rates for Cambridge high tech firms were unusually high, and exceeded rates for all East Anglia firms 9 and UK firms (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005) . Cambridge 
New Activity
Whether trends will recover in the Cambridge technology cluster will depend heavily on the success of new activity, such as occurred in the early 1990s when job losses in older companies were replaced by new jobs in emerging sectors. Newcomer firms spinning out from the university or starting up in the local enterprise centres may prefigure future trends as regards emerging tech-based activities. The websites of Cambridge Enterprise, St. Johns Innovation Centre and the Science Park were examined to see how many firms engaged in new types of activity have entered their directories ( Table 2 .) This is only a partial audit of firms in new sectors, but provides evidence of a shift into new activity during a period when the number of start-ups was contracting. The seven new firms with environmental technologies are accompanied by firms in other sectors (e.g. materials, R&D) with potential applications for the natural environment. Firms engaged in R&D are harbingers of new activity and these were found to be increasing in number, by over a hundred in five years. 
Reflections and further work
A database of all high tech firms in the Cambridge area has been used here to trace the growth of firms in diverse sectors. We have shown that a local firm's longevity is important to the accumulation of local competencies. In previous papers we have shown that many of the high tech firms in the area originated in the university, while others were attracted to the area or were encouraged by the success of others to start in Cambridge on an independent basis (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005) . There has been flow of talented and knowledgeable people who have found ways to apply knowledge to new areas of activity, a key stimulus to the Cambridge technology cluster. Competence accumulates through successive spin-outs of knowledge-based firms, as well as within specific firms. To trace the impact of firms originating in the university it is not enough to look at the first generation of firms. Spin-outs from previous spin-out firms create new clusters of activity over time. We have traced the development of new clusters, the Cambridge ink jet printing cluster and the ensuing display technology cluster, which originated from one university spin out firm, CCL. Competence can be transferred from one application to another, resulting in the emergence of new activity. Ink jet printing has proved to be more than a printing technology. It is now seen to be a deposition technology that can transform the way in which intelligent materials are created. One promising example is the display technology cluster, with high-growth start-ups like Cambridge Display Technology and Plastic Logic. New applications of the principles on which their technologies depend can give rise to environmental innovations.
Technology based enterprises commercialise knowledge with transformative potential that reveals itself over time. Today many Cambridge firms are developing innovations with actual or potential applications to environmental products and services. New companies need customers for their innovations. Government procurement of innovative products and services could demonstrate their value and stimulate private sector demand. In the Netherlands, all products procured by government will have to achieve high standards of sustainability by 2012, a way of stimulating demand for environmental innovation.
Demand for innovative products, capital for innovation and skilled and enterprising people are the ingredients for sustaining an innovative cluster. Continued support for scientific and engineering research in grants for doctoral and post-doctoral research are critical. Since quality of life has been a key attraction for the latter, neglected infrastructure and unrelieved congestion must be addressed. Local problem-solving by those most closely affected is hampered by centralisation of decision-making and of budgets and by the lack of integrated city development (Parkinson et al. 2006) .
As regards the availability of capital, in real value-creation there is delay and new firms lack retained earnings to tide them over. Value-creating companies must be able to access credit and external finance. Returns captured by technology investors from specific companies tend to be highly cyclical, setting off further cycles of funding availability. We have seen that Cambridge technology based firms are highly sensitive to cyclical trends in the economy. Though resilient over a quarter of a century, they have been showing signs of contraction since the technology downturn. While credit was available, they were subject to pressure from the financial sector to achieve value-capture more rapidly than was feasible. Unless these firms have the funds to create new value for users, financial value-capture cannot be sustained.
